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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Frank L. Maraist*
JUSTICIABILITY
A provision of the Louisiana Trust Code authorizes a
trustee to apply to the court for instructions concerning the
trust instrument or the administration of the trust. Under
certain circumstances, the order may be obtained in an ex parte
proceeding.1 In a recent case, a district judge refused a re-
quest for such instructions, holding that the statute which
authorized the ex parte proceeding was unconstitutional be-
cause it required the court to render an advisory opinion in
violation of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. In an opinion
that casts doubt upon the viability of the doctrine of justicia-
bility in Louisiana law, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
versed, 2 holding the statute constitutional.
Ordinarily, a dispute is justiciable if it may be resolved
through the judicial process; a dispute is non-justiciable if its
resolution has been committed to another branch of the gov-
ernment or to the people through the ballot box, or if the
particular dispute is not presented in a manner that can be
resolved through the judicial process although its resolution
has been committed to the judiciary. This last requirement
usually means that truly adverse parties with a genuine in-
terest in the outcome of the dispute must be before the court.3
The lack of truly adverse parties is reflected in the doctrine of
"standing," i.e., the requirement that the parties have
sufficient interest in the outcome to provide the necessary
adversity. The rule also prohibits a court from rendering a
declaratory judgment that does not have a sufficiently adverse
effect upon the parties; when the requisite adverse effect is
absent, the suit for declaratory judgment is said to be one
seeking an advisory opinion, and the controversy is deemed
non-justiciable. Whether the requisite adversity existed ap-
parently troubled the trial judge in In re Gulf Oxygen Welder's
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 9:2233 (Supp. 1964).
2. In re Gulf Oxygen Welder's Supply Profit Sharing Plan & Trust Agree-
ment, 297 So. 2d 663 (La. 1974). For a discussion of this case, see Note, 35 LA.
L. REV. 898 (1975).
3. Petition of Sewerage & Water Bd., 248 La. 169, 177 So. 2d 276 (1965).
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Supply Profit Sharing Plan and Trust Agreement, inasmuch
as he relied upon cases holding that certain claims for de-
claratory judgments were non-justiciable advisory opinions. 4
The majority opinion of the supreme court first distin-
guished the declaratory judgment cases as being founded
upon the declaratory judgment statute, and not upon any
constitutional requirement. The court then distinguished the
constitutional limits upon the state judiciary from those upon
the federal judiciary, pointing out that while the federal
judiciary may exercise only those powers granted under the
United States Constitution, all powers not reserved to the
people repose in the state government. Since the legislature
possesses the entire legislative power not reserved to the
people by the Louisiana Constitution, the court reasoned, the
legislature can delegate to the judiciary the exercise of any
function unless the exercise is expressly prohibited by the
constitution. Justice Tate then determined that since the ren-
dition of an ex parte order is a judicial function, it satisfies
the requirement of justiciability.5
The opinion leaves the reader in doubt as to the logic of
the majority. Perhaps it adopted the position that an ex parte
proceeding is a judicial function, and thus the request for an
ex parte order under the trust code does not require the court
to undertake a non-justiciable function. Certainly, there is
support in the opinion for that view.6 Or it may have con-
cluded that the doctrine of justiciability has no place in
Louisiana law, that a Louisiana court may exercise any func-
tion which the legislature assigns to it, provided that such an
exercise is not expressly prohibited by the state constitution.
Certainly some language in the opinion supports that view. 7
The court could have reached its conclusion without inflict-
ing any damage to the developing doctrine of justiciability. In
4. 297 So. 2d at 665.
5. Id. at 666.
6. "We find no authority that such [granting of instructions by the dis-
trict court as to doubtful legal questions arising in connection with the trust
instrument] is not a judicial function, whatever discretion ... the court may
have in its exercise or whether to exercise it." Id. at 665-66.
7. "In its exercise of the entire legislative power of the state, the legisla-
ture may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit."
Id. at 665. "None of these provisions, [La. Const. arts. II, VII (1921)], nor any
other we can find in our state constitution, prohibit the legislature from
vesting jurisdiction in the district courts to make judicial interpretations on
the application of trustees [of trust instruments]." Id. at 666.
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the United States, courts look to the adversaries for the mar-
shalling of the facts and the applicable law; thus truly ad-
verse parties usually are essential to a just decision. Al-
though the trustee is unopposed in the ex parte instruction
proceeding, he remains liable to the settlor and beneficiaries
for erroneous or negligent acts, including the manner of pre-
sentation of the case for the ex parte order.8 In addition, the
ex parte order will bar the trustee from seeking indemnifica-
tion from the third party with whom he has dealt.9 These
unusual circumstances should assure that the trustee will be
properly motivated to present to the court all of the facts and
law available to him surrounding the order. Thus, the re-
quirements of the adversary system may be satisfied al-
though the proceeding is ex parte. Furthermore, as Justice
Tate carefully observed in the majority opinion, the court
may obtain additional information before granting the order
by giving notice to the beneficiary or settlor of the pendency
of the proceeding, or by appointing an expert to assist it.
While the decision appears correct, unfortunately the
court failed to set forth clearly the doctrine upon which it is
based. While the case was decided under the constitution of
1921, the similarity of the language therein to the wording of
the constitution of 1974 probably would not dictate a different
result.'0
JURISDICTION
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure grants jurisdiction
to Louisiana courts over custody of minors in those cases in
which the child is "domiciled in, or is in," the state." The
exercise of that jurisdiction has presented significant legal
issues to Louisiana courts in the past year because of the
increasing mobility of the American people. One issue is the
extent to which a Louisiana court may continue to exercise
jurisdiction over a custody proceeding involving a child who is
no longer present or domiciled in the state, but who was in
the state at the time jurisdiction originally attached. Since
the domicile of the child is that of the parent to whom custody
is granted, 12 the child is no longer in or domiciled in Louisiana
8. LA. R.S. 9:2233(B) (Supp. 1964).
9. Id.
10. LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 & 2; LA, CONST. art. V, § 16. See Note, 35 LA.
L. REV. 898, 903-04 (1975).
11. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 10(5).
12. Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 135 So. 225 (1931); Stewart v. Stewart,
233 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 39.
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when the parent to whom custody is granted establishes a
domicile in another state, and there is no independent juris-
diction for custody purposes.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that when a court
acquires jurisdiction to render a money judgment for alimony
or child support, i.e., personal jurisdiction over the husband,
jurisdiction continues even though the defendant is no longer
within the state or otherwise amenable to suit for a money
judgment in a Louisiana forum.1 3 Does this concept of "con-
tinuing jurisdiction" extend to a custody decree, which, like
alimony or child support, is a modifiable family law judgment?
The first and second circuits have answered in the negative. 14
The fourth circuit has held that jurisdiction does continue, 15
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeal joined in that position
during the last term.' 6
It is unclear whether the exercise of continuing jurisdic-
tion in custody matters violates due process. The United
States Supreme Court apparently has not passed upon the
matter, but decisions of lower courts support the exercise of
such jurisdiction.' 7 It may be desirable that Louisiana courts
possess continuing jurisdiction, but it is important that they
exercise the power sparingly. The judgment might not be
entitled to full faith and credit in the new state of domicile of
the parent and child.' 8 The judgment may be effective in
Louisiana,' 9 but the child will be outside the state, and
Louisiana's residual interest as the place of the divorce or
separation and, perhaps, of the marriage, will be outweighed
by the interests of a sister state which is the domicile of the
child and of one of the parents. Comity dictates a discriminat-
ing exercise of continuing jurisdiction in such a child custody
case.
If the child is domiciled elsewhere but physically present
in the state, jurisdiction for custody purposes undoubtedly
exists. If the child is only transiently in the state, and there is
13. Imperial v. Hardy, 302 So. 2d 5 (La. 1974).
14. Stewart v. Stewart, 233 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Nowlin v.
McGee, 180 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 527, 180 So.
2d 541 (1965).
15. Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
16. Lynn v. Lynn, 316 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
17. Corkill v. Cloninger, 454 P.2d 911 (Mont. 1969). See also R. WEIN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 195 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as WEINTRAUB].
18. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); WEINTRAUB at 196-97.
19. WEINTRAUB at 196-97.
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no emergency involving his welfare, the state has a minimal
interest in the custody controversy. The state of domicile of
the child ordinarily will have a greater interest, and comity
dictates that Louisiana should recognize the paramount in-
terest of a sister state.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reached the proper
result in two cases during the most recent term, but a dispute
developed over the theory to be applied to reach the result. In
the first case, Smith v. Ford,20 the majority of a three-judge
panel wrote that if a child is only transiently in the state
the jurisdiction [conferred by article 10(5)] ... is intended
to be exercised, and with reasonable expectation of being
respected in other states can be exercised, only when
some acute exigency obliges the state to intervene for the
immediate necessities of the child's welfare ... 21
The language indicating a lack of jurisdiction prompted the
majority of the fourth circuit, sitting en banc, to overrule
Smith in Rafferty v. Rafferty.22 The majority in Rafferty cor-
rectly pointed out that the question is not one of jurisdiction,
but one of the extent to which comity might dictate that the
Louisiana court withhold exercise of the jurisdiction. Rafferty
explains that while the Louisiana court has jurisdiction, the
court must balance the competing interests of the two states
to determine whether Louisiana should give full faith and
credit to the foreign decree or make an independent determi-
nation of custody.
Both cases were correctly decided. In Smith the children
had been brought to Louisiana by the father against the
wishes of the mother, to whom custody had been awarded.
The Louisiana interest was minimal vis-a-vis the state of
domicile and an exercise of jurisdiction by this state could
have been offensive to the state of domicile. In Rafferty, the
mother with custody had brought the children to Louisiana
from Texas and left them with her parents for about two
months while she established a new domicile in Mas-
sachusetts. Given the minimal interests of the other states
involved and the manner and length of the children's stay in
Louisiana, exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
20. 288 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
21. Id. at 73.
22. 313 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision of State ex
rel. King23 supports the doctrine of abstention when the child
is transiently within the state and there is no compelling need
for Louisiana to exercise jurisdiction. In King the parents
were divorced in New York and the mother was awarded
custody; the father moved to New Orleans and subsequently
removed the children to Louisiana without the mother's con-
sent. The father then brought a proceeding in Louisiana seek-
ing a declaration under Louisiana R.S. 13:1570 that the chil-
dren were neglected. The supreme court held that jurisdiction
under the statute existed only when the child was domiciled in
or found within the state and the neglect took place within
the state. Finding that the children had not been neglected
within Louisiana, it dismissed the father's claim. In suggest-
ing alternative remedies that could have been available to
the father, the court suggested a custody action in New York
but noticeably omitted any reference to such an action in a
Louisiana court. This obvious omission supports the theory
that Louisiana courts, in the absence of some compelling
urgency, should abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction over
children who are temporarily within the state against the
wishes of the custodial parent. Abstention will not be satis-
factory, however, in those cases when it is necessary to utilize
the judicial process to return the physical custody to the
custodial parent, and in such a situation the court should
follow the procedure outlined by the majority in Rafferty.
Ascertainment of the theory upon which to base the con-
clusion presents a more difficult problem. Clearly the
Louisiana court has jurisdiction. If the court abstains, or
applies the doctrine of forum non conveniens, neither party
will be able to utilize a Louisiana court to enforce its claim
to custody. Such a result may be satisfactory unless the cir-
cumstances dictate that the state's judicial machinery should
be utilized to return the physical custody to the custodial
parent. In the latter case, the court may exercise jurisdiction
and (a) determine that it is required by the United States
Constitution to grant full faith and credit to the foreign cus-
tody decree, or (b) determine that since there are changed
circumstances it need not grant full faith and credit to the
foreign decree, but conclude that it is nevertheless compelled
by comity to enforce the foreign decree, or (c) disregard the
23. 310 So. 2d 614 (La. 1975).
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foreign decree and make an independent decision as to cus-
tody.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 5091 provides
that a Louisiana court may appoint an attorney to represent
an absentee or a non-resident over whom it has jurisdiction if
the defendant has not been served with process and has not
made a general appearance. The omnibus long arm statute
provides that a Louisiana court has jurisdiction over a non-
resident who commits certain acts having an effect inside the
state.24 It also provides that service under the long arm stat-
ute shall be by registered mail or by actual delivery of a copy
to the defendant.25 In Ray v. South Central Bell Telephone
Co.,26 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the method of
service prescribed in the long arm statute is exclusive and
that when jurisdiction is obtained under that statute, service
may not be effected upon an attorney pursuant to article
5091.
While the court's interpretation seems proper, the result
may be unfortunate. If the defendant is subject to jurisdic-
tion in personam, appointment of an attorney at law charged
with the duties of locating and informing the defendant of
the pendency of the action, and urging on behalf of the defen-
dant all defenses known to the attorney27 seems to provide
the fair notice required by the United States Constitution.
The desirability of an alternate procedure should be obvious
in the light of the difficulties that may ensue in service by
mail or through a foreign process server. Hopefully, the legis-
lature will authorize service upon an attoriey when jurisdic-
tion is obtained under the omnibus long arm statute.
CLASS ACTIONS
A class action may be maintained in a Louisiana state
court if joinder is impracticable, an adequate representative
of the class is before the court, and the character of the right
sought to be enforced by or against the class is common. 28 As
with other procedural devices phrased in broad conceptual
terms by the redactors of the- Code of Civil Procedure, 29 the
24. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964).
25. LA. R.S. 13:3204 (Supp. 1964).
26. 315 So. 2d 759 (La. 1975).
27. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 5094-95.
28. Id. arts. 591(1), 592.
29. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 463. See also State, Dep't of Hwys. v.
LamarAdv. Co. of La., Inc., 279 So. 2d 671 (La. 1973).
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lower courts have had difficulty in determining when the
character of a right is common. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal has held that the right is of common character when
the parties can be joined under the provisions of article 463,30
while the fourth circuit has held that the right is not common
unless the parties are necessary or indispensable under arti-
cles 641 and 642. 31
In Stevens v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension
Fund of the City of Shreveport,32 the second circuit joined
the fourth circuit view. On appeal the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed.33 Justice Tate, writing for three members of
the court, found that the character of the right sought to be
enforced is common when there is a "common-based right"
and the trial judge determines that a class action would
clearly be more useful than other available procedures for the
litigation of the claims.
The opinion indicates that a "common-based right" will
exist when the claims of the members of the class share a
common question of law or fact. If they do, Justice Tate
writes, then the court should determine whether the mainte-
nance of the action would promote judicial efficiency, provide
fairness to the parties, or foster some substantive state pol-
icy. Among the facts relevant to the policy decision are the
size of the individual claims, the interest of the members in
prosecuting separate suits, and the probable precedential ef-
fect of separate decisions upon the remaining claims. 34 Two
members of the court concurred in the result, one recused,
and one dissented. While the opinion can not be treated as
authoritative under these circumstances, it reflects two de-
sirable trends in judicial thinking: a continued move toward
the functional-and away from the conceptual-approach in
defining procedural devices, and a recognition that since the
federal class action is practically unavailable for the en-
forcement of state-created rights, a broad state class action is
desirable.35
30. Verdin v. Thomas, 191 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
31. Caswell v. Reserve Nat'l Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970).
32. 295 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975).
33. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975).
34. Id. at 151.
35. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff in a class
action may not aggregate his claim with the claims of other members of the
class to satisfy the requisite jurisdictional amount unless the claims are
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONTINUANCES
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1602 prescribes
certain mandatory grounds for a continuance, including the
absence of a material witness. Article 1601 provides that in
any case, a continuance may also be granted "if there is good
ground therefor." Both of these provisions were applied by
the Louisiana appellate courts in significant decisions during
the recent term.
In Sauce v. Bussel136 the supreme court, while emphasiz-
ing the "wide discretion" granted to the trial judge under
article 1601 and reaffirming that his decision should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of
abuse, reversed the trial judge's refusal to grant a con-
tinuance. The court determined that the plaintiffs seeking a
continuance, two of eleven in consolidated cases, had not pre-
viously engaged in delay tactics during the course of the
proceeding and that the illness of one of them was such that
he had been unable to assist his counsel in pre-trial prepara-
tion and would be unable to appear at the trial. This plain-
tiff's testimony was "critical" to both of the cases. Finally,
although the trial judge refused the continuance to the plain-
tiffs and dismissed their suits with prejudice, he granted con-
tinuances to the remaining consolidated cases set for trial on
the same day.37 The supreme court considered these cir-
cumstances an "extreme case"; the denial of a continuance
amounted to "an injustice" constituting an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. Justice Summers, in dissent, was impressed
by additional circumstances: the motion for continuance was
filed only after the court on the same day had denied a motion
to stay the proceeding in order to permit litigation of a simi-
lar claim in another court; other co-plaintiffs who were physi-
cally able to attend were not present when the matter was
"joint and common." See Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). It also has ruled
that when the claim of the named representative of the class exceeds the
jurisdictional amount, the claims of other members of the class which do not
meet the required amount in controversy may not be adjudicated by the
federal court under ancillary jurisdiction. See Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). The practical effect of these decisions is to bar from
federal court most class actions in which jurisdiction is based upon diversity
of citizenship, i.e., those in which state-created claims are sought to be en-
forced, inasmuch as the claim of each member of the class must exceed
$10,000.
36. 298 So. 2d 832 (La. 1974).
37. Id. at 834-35.
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called for trial, and counsel for plaintiff had not filed a re-
quired pre-trial memorandum.3 8
Generally, Louisiana attorneys consider the subpoena of
a witness an essential prerequisite to seeking a continuance
on the peremptory ground of the absence of that witness at
the trial. Article 1602, however, does not require a subpoena,
but merely provides that the witness have "absented himself
without the contrivance of the party applying for a con-
tinuance." While the subpoena of a witness who fails to ap-
pear might be sufficient grounds for a continuance in itself,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that the lack of a
subpoena will not preclude the granting of a continuance. In
Loicano v. Maryland Casualty Insurance Co. 39 the court ruled
that when the party seeking the continuance was reasonable
in his belief that the witness would appear without being
subpoenaed, the trial was continued for the taking of other
testimony, and there was no unfair surprise to the opposing
party, the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance
to permit the party to obtain the testimony of the absent
witness.
The Sauce and Loicano cases reflect careful consideration
by the courts of those policies which procedural rules are
designed to promote: judicial efficiency and fairness to the
parties. In both cases, no substantial judicial efficiency could
be achieved by refusing the continuance, no unfair prejudice
would result to the opponent from granting the continuance
and the conduct of the party seeking the relief had been
reasonable under the circumstances.
DISCOVERY
Louisiana discovery rules permit a litigant to obtain a
court order requiring a party whose mental or physical condi-
tion is in controversy to submit to an examination by a physi-
cian appointed by the court.40 Louisiana Code of Civil Proce-
dure article 1493 provides that the order must specify the
manner and conditions of the examinations. In Robin v. As-
sociated Indemnity Co.,4 1 the Louisiana Supreme Court
granted writs to review such an order by a trial judge. One
38. Id. at 839 (Summers, J., dissenting).
39. 301 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
40. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1493.
41. 297 So. 2d 427 (La. 1974).
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issue before the court was whether the physician would be
permitted to question the party examined about matters that
bore upon the question of liability. The court, recognizing
that an inquiry into the manner in which the accident oc-
curred might be necessary to a proper examination and diag-
nosis, deemed appropriate an order prohibiting the examiner
from asking questions "unnecessary to the medical examina-
tion and tending only toward a determination of questions of
liability."42 The court also held that when an examiner re-
cords his interrogation of the party examined and a con-
troversy is likely to develop over the manner in which the
examiner conducts the examination, an order requiring the
examiner to preserve the recordings and produce them when
he testifies is proper.
The court also ruled that while the party to be examined
does not have the right to have his attorney present during
the examination, the trial court may permit him to be pres-
ent. The factors which the court indicated would bear upon
such a decision include the extent to which the presence of
counsel might destroy the effectiveness of the examination,
as in psychiatric examination, and the extent to which his
presence may be needed to protect the party examined. In
this latter respect the court contrasted situations in which
the court suggested the examiner and those in which the
opposing party made the selection.4 3
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1452 provides
that a party who is served with notice of the taking of a
deposition may apply to the court for a protective order, and
if the court finds that relief is proper, it may render any order
which justice requires to protect a party from undue expense.
In Madison v. Travelers Insurance Co.," the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that this provision gives the trial judge dis-
cretion to require a party seeking to take depositions outside
Louisiana to pay the reasonable travel and lodging expenses
of opposing attorneys. There is nothing in the opinion indicat-
ing that the discretion would not extend to requiring pay-
ment of the same expenses for depositions within the state but
outside the judicial district in which the case is pending, and
42. Id. at 430.
43. Although it did not specifically pass upon the question, the court
implied that the party requesting an examination of an opposing party does
not have the right to select the examiner. Id. at 430.
44. 308 So. 2d 784 (La. 1975).
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a tenable argument could be made for such an order. Since a
witness who resides within the state can be compelled to
attend the trial at any other place in the state, the deposition
serves primarily to aid the party who initiates its taking in
his investigation of the case. Under those circumstances, it
may be reasonable to require that party to pay the expenses
of the opposing party who must attend or run the risk of
having the testimony used against him in the event of sub-
sequent death or unavailability of the witness. 45
JURY TRIALS
While Louisiana law generally permits jury trials in civil
cases, statutory provisions prohibit such trials in enumerated
types of actions. 46 When a single action is asserted in which
trial by jury is authorized, the litigants may elect to have
some of the issues determined by the jury and others by the
judge; all determinations are made after a single trial on the
merits.47 Difficulty arises, however, upon the joinder of sepa-
rate actions, only one of which is triable by a jury. If one
action is a principal demand and the other an incidental de-
mand, the code expressly provides an answer: the nature of
the principal demand determines whether any issue in an
incidental demand is triable by jury.48 But what if both are
principal demands, cumulated under the provisions of articles
462 or 463? Should there be a single trial by a judge, a single
trial by a jury, separate trials, or a single trial in which the
judge determines one action and the jury the other?
In a 1969 case, Jobe v. Hodge,49 the Louisiana Supreme
Court selected the first alternative. There, a public body was
named a co-defendant along with an individual defendant;
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial against the individual,
but not against the public body. The supreme court held that
since there could not be a jury trial in the claim against the
public body and article 1735 required that there be but one
trial, then both actions must be tried to the judge.
The supreme court overruled the much criticized Jobe
decision in Champagne v. American Southern Insurance Co.50
45. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 1428(3).
46. Id. arts. 1731, 1733.
47. Id. arts. 1732, 1734-35.
48. Id. art. 1731.
49. 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969).
50. 295 So. 2d 437 (La. 1974).
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The court held that when an action triable to a jury is prop-
erly joined under articles 462 or 463 with one triable by a
judge, the court should conduct a single trial, satisfying the
limitation of article 1735, but the jury should determine the
claims and issues properly committed to it while the judge
should decide the other issues and claims.
EXECUTORY PROCESS
Procedural due process of law in a civil action includes
fair notice and an opportunity to be heard before there is any
substantial deprivation of a property right. In a line of cases
beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.51 in 1969,
the United States Supreme Court has held that some pre-
judgment seizures, including the common law action of re-
plevin, violate due process because the defendant may be
deprived of a property right without adequate notice and a
prior opportunity to be heard. The decisions cast doubt upon
Louisiana procedures authorizing pre-judgment seizure, in-
cluding executory process, sequestration and attachment.
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 52 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled the Louisiana sequestration procedure did
not violate due process. The court found four distinctions
between Louisiana's sequestration procedure and the replev-
in action held unconstitutional in Fuentes v. Shevin,53 one of
which was that the Florida replevin procedure used in
Fuentes could issue by order of the clerk of court, while the
Louisiana sequestration could issue only upon order of a
judge.54 Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed another action in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court had upheld Louisiana's executory process, noting that
it did not involve a "substantial federal question. '55 In Mitch-
ell the writ of sequestration had been issued in Orleans
parish, in which all sequestration orders must be signed by
the judge; in the state's remaining parishes, however, a writ
of sequestration or a writ of executory process may issue
upon an order signed by the clerk only.56 This procedure
51. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
52. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see Note, 35 LA. L.
REv. 221 (1974).
53. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
54. For a listing of the four distinctions, see Note, 35 LA. L. REV. 221, 227
(1974).
55. Carmack v. Buckner, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
56. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 283. "The clerk of a district court may sign...
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raised the question whether the Louisiana executory and
sequestration procedures in the remaining parishes violated
due process in all cases or at least in those when the writ is
issued upon order signed by the clerk and not the judge.
The matter reached the Louisiana appellate courts dur-
ing the 1974-1975 term in Hood Motor Co. v. Lawrence.57 The
First Circuit Court of Appeal, alluding to the fact that the
United States Supreme Court in Mitchell had stressed the
judicial control of the Louisiana procedure as a factor distin-
guishing sequestration from the Florida replevin statute,
held that the issuance of executory process upon the signa-
ture of the clerk of court was a violation of due process. 58 On
certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court, "with some diffi-
dence," reversed and sustained the validity of the Louisiana
procedure when the writ is issued by the clerk.59 Justice Tate,
writing for a unanimous court, reasoned that the clerk, in
issuing executory process, acts in a quasi-judicial function,
and is under the same duty imposed upon the judge to deter-
mine whether a legal basis for the pre-judgment seizure is
established by the plaintiff. Mitchell, the court concluded, re-
quired judicial control by a state official, not necessarily con-
trol by a judge.
The court's diffidence may be well-founded. If the purpose
of the Sniadach-Fuentes doctrine is to minimize the pos-
sibilities of wrongful deprivation before notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, then the state official to whom the matter
is presented should have the competence, as well as the duty,
to determine whether there has been a compliance with the
law authorizing pre-judgment seizure. It is futile to argue
that a clerk, usually a layman, has the competence to deter-
mine if there is sufficient authentic evidence of the plaintiffs
right to use executory process, a conclusion not always appar-
ent to a Louisiana attorney.
A companion question as yet unanswered is the validity
under the Sniadach-Fuentes doctrine of Louisiana's resident
attachment procedure.8 0 Sequestration issues only where the
(2) an order for the issuance of... a writ.., of sequestration...." Id. art. 281
(provisions of article 283 do not apply to clerk of the District Court for
Orleans Parish).
57. 307 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
58. Id.
59. 320 So. 2d 111 (La. 1975).
60. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3542 (writ of attachment may be obtained in an
action for money judgment against a resident, regardless of the origin of the
claim).
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plaintiff claims ownership or a mortgage or privilege on the
property subject to seizure;6 1 thus the seizing creditor has or
claims an interest in the property that antedates the suit.
Resident attachment in Louisiana may issue although the
plaintiff does not assert a pre-suit interest in the property
attached. It is arguable that the protection afforded the de-
fendant against erroneous pre-judgment seizure should be
greater when the creditor has no pre-suit interest in the
property seized. The United States Supreme Court, since ad-
vancing the Sniadach-Fuentes doctrine, has not upheld a
pre-judgment seizure in which the plaintiff did not have a
pre-suit interest in the property seized.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2635 provides,
"The plaintiff shall submit with his petition [for executory
process] the authentic evidence necessary to prove his right
to use executory process. . . ." The language of the article
seems to indicate clearly that the authentic evidence must
exist at the time the order for executory process issues, but a
recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court casts doubt
upon that conclusion. In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Car-
son Homes, Inc., 2 the act of mortgage, purportedly in authen-
tic form, was in fact executed in the presence of only one
witness; the other witness and the notary signed at a later
time. The holder of the mortgage note proceeded by executory
process, and the defendant sought to enjoin, urging that the
mortgage was not in authentic form and thus the require-
ments of executory process had not been met. At the hearing
for the injunction, the maker acknowledged execution of the
mortgage. The supreme court, following established jurispru-
dence, held that parol evidence was admissible to establish
that the act had not been executed in the presence of the
notary and two witnesses and therefore was not an authentic
act within the purview of Louisiana Civil Code article 2234.
Plaintiff argued that the acknowledgment by the maker
at the hearing had the effect of an authentic act, and that
executory process therefore was valid. Justice Barham, in
dissent, supported this view, concluding that executory pro-
cess was proper if the authentic evidence was furnished at
any time before the sale.A6 The majority did not speak spe-
61. Id. art. 3571.
62. 316 So. 2d 732 (La. 1975).
63. Id. at 736 (Barham, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 36
1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975 571
cifically to this point, but by dicta raised hopes of such a
conclusion. Rather than place its decision upon the obvious
language of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2635
that the authentic evidence must accompany or be presented
with the petition for executory process, the majority based its
opinion that executory process was unavailable upon the con-
clusion that the acknowledgment by the debtor could pro-
duce only an acknowledged act, and since the property subject
to foreclosure was immovable property, an authentic act was
required. It is thus arguable that if the foreclosure is one
against movable property, for which an acknowledged instru-
ment is sufficient,6 4 then a judicial acknowledgment at the
hearing on the preliminary injunction may cure any prior
formal defect in the execution of the chattel mortgage. Since
such an acknowledgment will be readily available except in
rare cases of perjury or forgery, the dicta of American Bank
could precipitate an erosion of the requirement of submission
of an acknowledged instrument with the petition for execu-
tory process on movable property.
REAL ACTIONS
The redactors of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
combined the action to establish title and the pre-code peti-
tory action into a single action, the present petitory action,6 5
and imposed upon the plaintiff in a petitory action brought
against a defendant in possession the burden of "making out
his title" rather than simply proving a title better than that
of the possessor.66 The redactors, however, did not specifically
abolish the action to remove a cloud from a title; the courts
then held that the judicially-created remedy survived the
codification and presented an alternative to the petitory ac-
tion in those cases in which the defendant was in possession
by virtue of a recorded deed.67 The oversight, and the survival
of the action to remove cloud, would be of little consequence
unless it afforded a litigant a substantial procedural advan-
tage not available through the petitory action.
In Verret v. Norwood,68 decided during the recent term by
64. LA. R.S. 9:5353 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 113, § 1.
65. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3651.
66. Id. art. 3653 (1).
67. Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d
375 (1963); Shell v. Greer, 171 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
68. 311 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 842 (La. 1975).
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the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, the court ruled that if
title is at issue in an action to remove a cloud from title, the
burden of proof upon the plaintiff is the same as it would be if
the petitory action had been brought. This sensible decision is
laudable and perhaps is the next best thing to the judicial
abrogation of the action to remove cloud on title, a task
which, as the court pointed out in Verret, belongs to the su-
preme court. When that court denied writs in Verret, three
justices indicated they were willing to reach such a conclu-
sion.6 9
In Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner,70 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that when a petitory action is brought against a
defendant who is in possession, the plaintiff must "make out
his title thereto" by proving a title "good against the world."
But how does one prove such a title? Two methods seem
beyond dispute: the plaintiff may establish record title back
to the sovereign or he may prove a prescriptive title.71 But
what if the plaintiff merely traces the titles of both claimants
back to the same vendor and shows a superior deed out of
that common author? The Third Circuit Court of Appeal has
ruled that the "common authorship" method is sufficient to
establish title good against the world.
In Clayton v. Langston,7 2 the defendant was in possession;
the plaintiff then established record title back to 1922 and to
the common ancestor of plaintiff and defendant. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that this proof of title back to a
common ancestor shifts the burden to the defendant to prove
his title. In so doing, the court apparently concluded that the
"common author" title is "title good against the world"
sufficient to satisfy the Skinner rule. This rule, while it may
be pragmatically sound, is theoretically disturbing. In Skin-
ner the court held that the choices were two, prove a title
good against the world or make out a better title. If one is
required to place the "common author" doctrine in one of
69. Justice Barham dissented from the denial of the writ stating that the
court should expressly overrule Walmsley, since Louisiana no longer has an
action to remove cloud from title. Justices Tate and Dixon concurred in the
denial because the "result" was correct, but agreed, with Justice Barham
that the action to remove a cloud was "probably not authorized since the
enactment of the 1960 Code [of Civil Procedure]." 313 So. 2d 842 (La. 1975).
70. 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974).
71. Id. at 799: "Respondents, therefore, have not established either valid
record title or prescriptive title to the property in dispute" (emphasis added).
72. 311 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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these two categories, it is obvious that it is only a better title.
Until the supreme court speaks to the effect of the Skinner
doctrine upon the "common author" rule, uncertainty will
continue.
RES JUDICATA
The Louisiana doctrine of res judicata differs from that of
the common law. The latter is broad, and generally bars sub-
sequent relitigation of all matters which might have been
raised by the prior litigation, while the Louisiana version
limits the preclusive effect of a judgment to those matters
that actually were litigated. 73 In its only expression on the
subject during the 1974-75 term, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reaffirmed this narrow interpretation of the Louisiana
doctrine of res judicata and again cast doubt upon the exis-
tence in this state of its doctrinal companion, collateral es-
toppel.74
In Sliman v. McBee,75 plaintiff sold property to defendant,
the balance of the purchase price being represented by four
notes; plaintiff did not take a mortgage or reserve a vendor's
lien, however. Subsequently, plaintiff filed suit seeking rec-
ognition of a vendor's lien and also seeking rescission of the
sale for non-payment of the purchase price. The matter was
compromised by payment of the first note and an agreement
by the purchasers to pay the remaining notes. The purchasers
then mortgaged the property to a bank, which subsequently
foreclosed. The seller intervened, seeking judgment for the
balance of the remaining notes and asserting a vendor's lien
on the property. Judgment was rendered recognizing the debt
to seller but rejecting her claim to a vendor's lien; that judg-
ment became final. The seller (plaintiff) then filed the instant
suit seeking to rescind the sale for non-payment of the re-
maining notes. The lower court dismissed the suit, and the
court of appeal affirmed, 76 finding that through certain lan-
guage in the act of sale the seller had waived her right to
rescind the sale as well as her vendor's lien. The Louisiana
Supreme Court granted writs and reversed. 77 The court first
found that the seller had not waived the right to rescind by
73. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2285-86; Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14
(1954). See also Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1975).
74. Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248 (La. 1975).
75. 300 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd, 311 So. 2d 248 (La. 1975).
76. Id. at 589.
77. 311 So. 2d 248 (La. 1975).
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the language of the act of sale; it then held that the right to
rescind for non-payment of the remaining three notes was not
barred by res judicata, arising from either the compromise
agreement or the final judgment in the second suit.
The court pointed out that res judicata does not apply in
Louisiana unless there is an identity of parties, demands and
causes. Cause, as used in the res judicata sense, is not the
motive for the obligation, but is the "legal obligation upon
which the action is founded. 7 8 Since each note constituted a
separate obligation, there was no identity of causes between
the first and second suits. Although the second and third
suits were based upon the same notes, there was no identity
of demands because the demands for payment of the purchase
price and for rescission for non-payment of the purchase price
are separate.
The court found the alternative plea of estoppel by judg-
ment 79 inapplicable but carefully avoided an express holding
that the doctrine exists in Louisiana. While it is frequently
assumed that estoppel by judgment was introduced into
Louisiana in California Company v. Price,8° subsequent su-
preme court cases have cast doubt upon that assumption, and
one intermediate appellate court has refused to apply it.81
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of facts which were ad-
judicated in a prior action between the parties. The applica-
tion of collateral estoppel would produce a broader preclusive
effect to prior judgments than that now provided by the nar-
row Louisiana version of res judicata, thus undercutting the
supreme court's restricted application of the latter doctrine.
78. Id. at 255.
79. The court used the term "judicial estoppel" instead of "estoppel by
judgment" (sometimes called collateral estoppel) but it is clear that the court
was referring to the latter doctrine. The term "judicial estoppel" should be
used to refer to the rule which prohibits parties from changing their position
during litigation once they have initially taken a particular position in their
pleadings. See Comment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estop-
pel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158 n.3 (1974).
80. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
81. Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Johnson v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 201 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Comment, Preclu-
sion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158 (1974). To
the same effect is a third circuit case, Johnson v. Sweat, 265 So. 2d 801 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 211 (1972).
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